Over the past 10 years, Mexican officials and scientists have promoted the project of protecting Mexican forests in order to mitigate climate change, forests acting to absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. This article compares existing policies around mass reforestation and markets for environmental services, and their relationships to a policy in construction -Reduced Emissions through Degradation and Deforestation. Mass reforestation policies collapsed in the face of politicized audits and stories about corruption; markets for environmental services continued with little criticism, stabilized in part by the charisma of Reduced Emissions through Degradation and Deforestation policies. I explain the collapse of mass reforestation policies as being due to failed knowledge performances by officials and scientists; such failures are assessed by more or less skeptical publics who expect specific ways of performing credible public knowledge. Areas of nonknowledge can be tamed as calculable uncertainty, or alternatively transformed into ontological indeterminacy, scandals, and stories of corruption. Areas of nonknowledge are not pathological: they may support, as well as undermine, climate science, the authority of institutions, or the credibility of carbon accounts.
Introduction
In July 2009, my collaborator Dr Guadalupe Rodriguez Gomez 1 and I entered the office of Juan Vazquez, 2 a senior official of the Mexican Forestry Commission (CONAFOR). We wanted to find out about government policies that supported forest protection and mass reforestation and to ask how these might be connected with preventing climate change. Things began to go wrong when I asked Vazquez for his views on the national reforestation program (ProArbol). At first, he parried our questions with bland generalities about the smooth functioning of the reforestation campaign, but he soon became hostile, aggressively criticizing our skill as interviewers. Outside, heavy afternoon clouds had darkened and it began to rain hard.
That's no way to ask a question, you need to come with a questionnaire about what you want to know, you are mixing everything up, this is not the way to do things! (Field notes, 22 July 2009) I tried my question again in another form, but with no better luck. Outside, hail began to fall. Vazquez leapt up and gazed out the window at the car park. He told us that he was worried that his car might be damaged by hailstones, that this had happened to him before, and that it had cost a lot of money to repair. He was nervous, agitated, and contentious, sitting down behind his desk, standing up to look out of the window once again. Guadalupe sympathetically recounted the misadventures of her own car and explained interview methods, open and closed questions, and the goals of ethnography. We parted on formally amicable terms, but we had learned little about trees, reforestation, or climate change. On the same day and in the same building, we had met with a quite different reception. Eduardo Espinoza, an official who was involved in linking Mexican forests to markets for environmental services in a program known as Payment for Environmental Services (PSA), had been happy to celebrate the successes of his work, measured not in tree survival but in the area of averted deforestation. Millions of hectares of Mexican forests had been protected, he told us, thanks to a program that paid landowners for the hydrological or conservation services provided by their forests. Espinoza also told us about the ongoing work of linking Mexican forests to satellite images and possible global carbon markets through so-called Reduced Emissions through Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) 3 policies that have emerged from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process. REDD policies would compensate forest landowners for the carbon dioxide stored in growing forests. For Vazquez, the life and death of trees was not dangerous; he was cheerful, friendly, and happy to talk.
In this article, I will compare three political/technological projects that link nonknowledge about living trees, state institutions, and individual careers with public facts and alternative forest futures. As discussed in detail in the following, I use the term 'nonknowledge' to designate the inherently contestable quality of public facts put forward about forests in the face of uncertain present and future versions of the world. These public facts are produced through performances that place a call upon more or less skeptical, knowledgeable, or occasionally interested audiences who can sustain or undermine a knowledge performance, depending upon whether it fits their criteria for expertise, grip, authoritative grasp, or framing of proper knowledge making (Jasanoff, 2005: 81) . At some moments, such knowledge performances fail to stick, allowing scandals to emerge. In what follows, I argue that we should think about such public facts not as stable established objects of knowledge that successfully dominate collective imaginations, but as lively, provisional performances that are always linked to what is uncertain and not known. Furthermore, I will argue that uncertainty and nonknowledge are not defects but sources of energy that allow experts of various kinds to enact their technical skills, whether as bureaucratic actors or as scientists with an authoritative knowledge of forest landscapes. In this way of thinking, public facts are accompanied by the unstable possibilities of failure and scandal that can unmake those facts, as well as institutions and careers. This uncertainty also marks possibilities of reaping economic value, building powerful institutions, and stabilizing performances of skilled, technical knowledge. Government officials, biologists, forestry technicians, and environmental nongovernmental organization (NGO) leaders in Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Oaxaca are skilled practitioners in the art of knowledge making, as revealed in their assessment of the public knowledge-making performances of others. They are key actors in unruly publics who help stabilize official knowledge performances, even as they circulate alternative facts and stories about possible failure and lack of skill, about the limits of accounting and of the failure to know.
Most of the time, the life or death of a tree seedling is of no importance to anyone; a single pine tree produces tens of thousands of seeds a year. Sometimes, however, seedlings matter a great deal, and the survival of trees in a distant forest is woven into the debates of national parliaments, the charisma of presidents, the fate of the world climate, and the careers of officials or the texture of environmental markets. In what follows, I describe the rise and fall of a mass reforestation program in Mexico as the making and unmaking of a public fact, a moment when nonknowledge about lively people and things ceased to be statistical uncertainty and became perilous indeterminacy. I compare the fact of successful mass reforestation with a related public fact of the protection of Mexican forests by a PSA program, which is also supported by the then-yet-to-exist REDD carbon markets program. 4 I describe how framings of expertise and accountability, and expectations of how knowledge should be performed and witnessed, together with enduring narratives about the state and the presidency and popular understandings of trees and forests, allowed nonknowledge about where trees lived and died to become a reforestation scandal that unmade scales and shook Mexican forestry institutions. At that same time, the alternative project of linking forests to the national environmental services program and the incipient international REDD carbon market proceeded as yet unthreatened 5 because of the different ways in which nonknowledge about present and future forests was aligned with performances of expertise and popular understandings of forests.
Knowledge, nonknowledge, and the performance of expertise
In this article, I use the term nonknowledge 6 to open an inquiry into how different sources of uncertainty, danger, and liveliness come to be known and managed while suspending the question of whether an area of uncertainty should be characterized as a sociotechnical risk, a political drama, or a financial risk. This allows me to focus attention on how areas of nonknowledge come to be domesticated in these different arenas by following the publics, actors, and objects linked to domains of nonknowledge. The literature on Science and Technology Studies (STS) abundantly demonstrates that the boundary between science and politics is constantly remade and continually contested (Gieryn, 1995) ; so too the literature on state formation shows us that who is inside and who is outside the state at Harvard Libraries on October 26, 2016 sss.sagepub.com Downloaded from is a continually contested issue (Nugent, 2010) . It is therefore never clear beforehand whether an area of nonknowledge is technical or political; in a sense, then, we only know which it is by attending to the actors who gather around and declare themselves to be associated with an area of nonknowledge, with particular political, financial, or technical consequences.
Scholars of modernity have been concerned with how knowledge is produced, by whom, upon whom it is imposed, and at whose cost (e.g., Mitchell, 2002; Scott, 1998) Some scholars have analyzed how forms of official ignorance can override or efface other knowledge (Dove, 1983; Kuchinskaya, 2013; Mathews, 2011) . STS scholars, in particular, have been concerned with how knowledge is produced and stabilized by material-semiotic alliances (Latour, 1990; Latour and Woolgar, 1987) and with how public knowledge is produced through performances that implicate the authority of the state and its publics (Hilgartner, 2000; Jasanoff, 2004) . Across this diverse range of approaches, ignorance has often been seen as a negative or residual category: what is left over after knowledge is made. Although recent scholarship has begun to consider the ways in which ignorance is actively produced (e.g. Proctor and Schiebinger, 2008) , such accounts often see ignorance as politically convenient, intentionally or unintentionally. Moreover, ignorance is largely figured as absence, rather than as generative presence. There is also, however, a rich tradition of thinking about nonknowledge, ignorance, indeterminacy, and uncertainty of various kinds, from the observation that new knowledge produces new kinds of risks (Beck, 1992) to the observation that science produces ignorance of ignorance (Ravetz, 1993) and must act on incomplete or indeterminate knowledge (Ravetz, 2006) . Within environmental anthropology, the value of official ignorance for maintaining the authority of states (Dove, 1983) as well as of particular bureaucracies and individual bureaucrats (Mathews, 2005) has been remarked upon. These findings resonate with Jacqueline Best's (2012) observation that interpretative ambiguity can be a source of power. Similarly, McGoey (2012) points to the value of strategic ignorance, to the generative power of 'negative knowledges'. In addition, experts may perform their authority by drawing attention to uncertainty and to their own limited knowledge (McGoey, 2009) .
Nonknowledge can be generative and take various forms, with different technical and political consequences. Gross (2007) helpfully distinguishes between various kinds of nonknowledge, pointing out how one form may cycle through into another, from known unknowns to radically unknown unknowns. Following Karen Barad (2007) , we can call these uncertainty and indeterminacy, respectively. Politicians and scientists struggle to characterize and stabilize nonknowledge about Mexican forests in relation to their performances of knowledge, in order to turn nonknowledge into a calculable statistical uncertainty -rather than an ontological indeterminacy, which might signal technical incompetence or political corruption. The various actors concerned with making and witnessing knowledge about Mexican forests are never able beforehand to specify what kind of nonknowledge is made visible in political performances or in scientific knowledge making about forests. It is only in retrospect that they and we can decide whether a public performance was, for example, a political failure to tame unruly citizens, a scientist's failure to persuade skeptical colleagues, an ontological indeterminacy as to what a tree or a forest was, or a successful staging of statistical uncertainty about tree mortality.
Producing public facts that young trees are growing or that carbon is being stored in expanding forests requires an expert performance that places a call upon more or less skeptical, knowledgeable, or occasionally interested publics (Jasanoff, 2004 (Jasanoff, , 2005 . Publics are inevitably self-constituting, open-ended, and ultimately indefinable (Warner, 2002) . It is precisely their open-ended and undefined characters that allow publics to do their work of assenting that scientists' and officials' expert performances demonstrate a public fact, whether of state authority or of scientific knowledge. In this sense, the size and response of publics becomes a domain of nonknowledge, which is tamed by officials and scientists who are never entirely certain what their colleagues, rivals, and audiences will make of their enactments of expertise (Carr, 2010) .
Although, as I have described previously, there has been a long-standing concern with lively objects and publics in the domains of STS and anthropology, respectively, thinking with nonknowledge reveals similarities between the mundane practices of scientists and functionaries. The term 'nonknowledge' allows us to follow how and why the mundane practices occasionally become scandals that upset institutions and careers. Nonknowledge of the size and response of publics or of the behavior of living trees are areas of possibility that define both the limits and the existence of technical or political expertise. Enactments of expertise could come to be interpreted as political authority by some audiences, as credible technical skill by others, or as valuable risk that has been tamed through calculation by skilled market actors (Ho, 2005) . If we reexamine the classic ethnography of laboratory life by Latour and Woolgar (1987) , we can see that objects with the capacity to surprise, and therefore remain a domain of nonknowledge, were always part of the story. Even as scientists persuasively suppress other scientists' interpretations of the world, they also hesitantly read stuttering communications from inanimate but somehow lively objects. Expertise, therefore, is not only a dramatic performance, it also stages the liveliness of objects or audiences in order to confer value upon experts themselves (Carr, 2010) . Liveliness is a sign of recalcitrant people and things, of materials and people who have the delightful capacity to surprise us and the irritating ability to frustrate us. 7 Liveliness is a sign of surprise and of resistance, of the ultimately unknowable unfoldings of animals and plants (Tsing, 2005) . Surprises are often also a sign of failure, of not being able to entirely predict what kinds of things plants and people may do. Knowing and not knowing are linked here; it is through the limits of knowing and by continually reflecting upon our own past failures that we come to know our skill and the limits of our knowledge.
If experts and political actors live by their uncertain relationships with people and things, the knowledge they produce is more fragile and provisional than it is often believed to be. Experts, far from being the confident holders of certain and authoritative knowledge, are in fact mediators, who translate the unknown into the known, through public stagings of principled hesitation and doubt (Hilgartner, 2000; Jasanoff, 1998; McGoey, 2009 ) that seek to elicit the imaginations of their audiences. We can also think about political authority and the charisma of markets in this way. As Karen Ho (2009) shows us, the riskiness of markets is performed by investment bankers who make themselves authoritative and knowledgeable precisely because they sit closest to lively market risk. In the domain of politics and the state, many scholars have described how the authority of political figures and states is stabilized by threatened disorder and chaos of unruly and rebellious ethnic others (Scott, 2009) ; in each of these cases, an area of nonknowledge is tamed in order to produce something else.
Efforts to tame uncertainty and manage risk are in the end always provisional (Power, 2007) . This is perhaps most clear in the area of reputational risk, where organizations seek to prevent damaging scandals (Power, 2004) . Scandals, when reputations are radically transformed, are therefore good places to look at how knowledge is stabilized against nonknowledge. At moments of scandal, what was considered small and insignificant becomes important, and what was formerly unknown becomes known. Studies of accounting scandals are therefore helpful for thinking about how small issues can become large scandals that connect distant people and things, with unpredictable political, technical, or financial consequences. As Donald MacKenzie (2008) argues, a finitist perspective focuses our attention on the small-scale decisions as to whether or not to 'count' something as following a rule. No rule for recognizing whether a tree seedling is alive or dead fully covers all the possibilities: someone still has to exercise skilled practical judgment about whether or not to record an expense on a piece of paper and about whether to record a dead tree or a living area of forest. This makes the small details of accounts potentially consequential, as when notations on papers by low-level clerical workers erupted into the scandal that destroyed Enron (MacKenzie, 2008: 109-136) . No system of accounting encompasses everything, because existing classifications inherently produce overflows (Callon, 1998) that cannot be counted because they cannot fit tidily within the existing accounting scheme. 8 Sometimes such overflows can be counted as 'externalities'; at other moments, they become scandalous and dangerous lapses, when notations on a distant scrap of paper by a subordinate in a faraway forest can call into question the credibility of the Mexican forest service.
Scandals, then, can be moments when small things become untethered from previous associations and come to stand for a general category, such as state corruption, misdeeds by climate scientists, or financial wrongdoing. Scandals unpredictably link the faraway and the small because they are moments when scales are in flux. In such moments, mundane details and small notations become of large significance because witnessing publics link them to powerful and well-established framings of expertise, political authority, or the state (see, for example, Jasanoff's, 2005, discussion of mad cow disease in the United Kingdom). We can think about the possibility of analogous political scandals if we take seriously the skill and drama of public knowledge making by officials whose performances are bounded by the possibilities of failure and scandal. The interest in public knowledge performances, for the publics who come into being around them, lies partly in the possibility of failure and scandal, in witnessing publics' various understandings of how apparently large facts are properly woven from the many weak material-semiotic threads that might, perhaps, refuse to stay where they are put. For these inherently lively publics, success is evaluated against the possibility of failure, while skill is evaluated by the possibility of failure or incompetence. Presidents, bureaucrats, and technicians, perform knowledge before unruly and often skeptical publics and against the fates of trees or of future forests, which might fail to collaborate. The liveliness of audiences and of possible futures makes these knowledge performances interesting (the knowledgeable audience holds its breath; the tightrope walker might fall), demonstrating the generative potential of nonknowledge that could become uncertainty, indeterminacy, or risk.
Failures of calculation: Planting trees before the scandal
In July 2008, Mexico was in a frenzy of tree planting. President Calderon himself had planted a tree in the garden of the presidential residence, traveling to four states to plant still other trees on the all-important national reforestation day, July 5 ( Figure 1 ).
The goal of this national program was to plant a total of over 5 million trees, but officials declared the goal to be far surpassed. A breathless media telethon tracked the progress as millions of trees were planted. At the end of the day, it was announced that 8,323,063 trees had been planted by 460,000 volunteers and tens of thousands of government employees. Across Mexico, state governors and senior government ministers were photographed planting trees, applauded, and accompanied by enthusiastic citizens (Cevallos, 2007) . Although the Mexican state has long dedicated large sums of money to reforestation, this latest campaign was driven largely by the enthusiasm of President Calderon, who not long after coming to office in 2006 had committed Mexico to the Federación, 2009) . Like other presidents before him, Calderon found international environmental commitments a way to be part of the club, to position Mexico on the international stage and, just possibly, to improve his image before Mexican publics who compare the Mexican state unfavorably with other governments.
United Nations Environment Program billion tree initiative (Auditoria Superior de La
In other places, and at other times, states have embarked upon mass reforestation programs (Knight, 1997; Yeh, 2009) . Such programs lend themselves to celebratory statistics, to images of regimented people and landscapes (Scott, 1998: 14-18) , and to promises of moral and environmental regeneration. Media representations of massive reforestation performed the Mexican state and the nation as unified in time, coherent in space, and up to date on global policy. Some knowledgeable observers were less persuaded. An opposition politician (who I will call Oracio) acerbically remarked to me: [Calderon's] public security policies didn't work. Energy reform didn't work … they all failed. The only space he had left was, oddly, the environment. And you see it in the national reforestation program … it reminded me of the era when as a child they used to send me [to plant trees], the era of Echeverria. (Interview transcript, 24 July 2008) Calderon and his advisors wanted to make planting trees look like fun, to get citizens involved. Crowds of cheerful people planted trees; this was a civic event, a moment of pleasurable public-spirited volunteerism. Perhaps, this was a new kind of privatesponsored activism; many events were supported by the Bimbo group, a large corporation (Reforestamos Mexico AC, 2008) . For Oracio, this mass reforestation reminded him of his childhood, when the state was more corporatist and authoritarian; it was a media performance that was somehow out of its time. Mass reforestation has indeed been a perennial favorite policy for Mexican presidents. From the 1930s presidency of Lazaro Cárdenas onward (Anonymous, 1949; Cárdenas, 1978 Cárdenas, [1937 ; Garcia Toledo, 1933; Mathews, 2011) , the Mexican state has asserted the importance of regulated and managed forests in restoring a nature that it claims has been damaged by rural or indigenous people. The regimentation and visual order of mass reforestation has been part of its appeal, helping perform an ordered state and an ordered society, including in statistical recitations by politicians and officials. Such reforestation campaigns have often relied upon cheap or free rural labor to plant large numbers of trees, many of which die (e.g. Anonymous, 1950; Mathews, 2005) . This latest campaign was therefore somehow both old-fashioned and new, both statist and corporate sponsored, and knowledgeable observers like Oracio felt it to be somehow tone deaf, out of tune, and out of time.
The beginning of scandal … trees have been dumped
Just over a year before, on 5 July 2007, President Calderon and his young son Jorge had planted a sweet gum tree in the historic Viveros de Coyoacán, a tree nursery and public park in Mexico City. A year later, reporters from the Reforma newspaper went back to see how the tree was doing. Embarrassingly, it was almost dead, with only one branch clinging to life (Figures 2 and 3 ).
Searching for some additional interpretation, or possibly a critical comment, the reporters interviewed the respected environmental NGO leader Sergio Madrid, whose offices were near the possibly dying tree. Madrid suggested that it is entirely normal for young trees to grow slowly: 'the only thing you could say is that the president didn't have a green thumb' (no tuvo muy buena mano) (Alatorre, 2008) . This had an unfortunate double entendre. Not only did it imply that the president might not be a gifted gardener, but it also suggested that he killed whatever he touched, like King Midas, only worse. The next day, the website of Madrid's organization was hacked, files were deleted, and a threatening message was posted. For the several NGO leaders who told me about this event, it was clear that someone, somewhere in the interstices of the Mexican state, had acted to protect the reputation of the president. This episode reveals important things about the meanings of reforestation at this particular moment and the ways in which mundane performances of presidential authority could be affected by public commentary about the life or death of a particular tree. This tree was linked directly to the president himself and to a national reforestation project that would produce a national public, a unified time and space of tree planting and of civic and environmental restoration. Efficacy mattered; failure could be threatening, perhaps to Calderon or perhaps to his close advisors.
This was only the beginning of an increasing barrage of criticism. Over the summer and fall of 2008, Greenpeace carried out a small survey of reforestation projects from previous years and announced that 90 percent of planted trees died, and that many trees were not of native species or not even trees at all (Greenpeace Mexico, 2008b) . A skillfully conceived public theater of trees in coffins in the main plaza of Mexico City (see Figure 4 ) made a mockery of the love and care with which volunteers had planted trees. A brilliant cartoon in the style of a 1950s newsreel showed President Calderon turning 20 peso notes into toilet paper and planting trees on streets, cars, and roofs (see national media stage. Mexican publics were more or less skeptical, willing to plant trees, yes, but also willing to believe that such plantings did little good and willing to take up a narrative of the state as corrupt or inept when official knowledge performances failed. Enduring framings and powerful stories about the character of the state rendered the making of credible public knowledge difficult but certainly not impossible. Imaginative media campaigns drew upon entrenched understandings of the Mexican state as corrupt, dangerous, and opaque, but they only surfaced because of the lack of credibility and the relatively few political/epistemic alliances of the forestry commission, CONAFOR. Critically, the credibility of reforestation relied upon common sense understandings of what counted as a tree and upon expectations of how credible and authoritative knowledge should be performed. When these expectations were not met, and when common sense understandings of what counted as a tree were violated, nonknowledge about where trees lived and died could become scandal. 
Audit, counter-audit, and the unmaking of mass reforestation
The agency directly responsible for running the reforestation program was the National Forestry Commission, CONAFOR, and it was upon its director, Jose Cibrian, 9 that the storm broke. Cibrian was a respected biologist, but he was less successful as a political actor. His job was to tame the unruly ecology of officials and organizations who jostle for government funds and for popular support, who might take part in consultative technical panels, write editorials, or temporarily blockade government offices. A rather unusual feature of Mexican science and politics is that academics and NGO leaders who are part of the audience for official knowledge performances may themselves become important officials. Senior academics can become government ministers, then work as consultants, set up an NGO, and return to government office once again (Mathews, 2011) . At the critical moment, almost none of these knowledgeable actors was prepared to stand up and publicly support Cibrian's claim that overall, a reasonable proportion of the trees had survived.
A hearing in the Mexican house of deputies in October 2008 went badly. When asked to explain official reforestation statistics, Cibrian turned to his deputy and asked for help; according to one witness, his critic went for the jugular, saying, 'You're here to tell us about your institution, not to have your office boy do your work' (interview transcript, 6 August 2009). 10 Cibrian scrambled to defend CONAFOR and the reforestation program, commissioning an external audit in order to prove that reforestation was effective, that 54 percent of trees had survived, and that public funds had not been misspent (Jiménez Pérez, 2008) . This audit was not persuasive. Critics argued that it had been funded by CONAFOR and that the auditors were personally too close to Cibrian.
The counter-audit commissioned by the Mexican parliament found fault not only in the number of trees reported to have survived but also in the definitions of a tree (Auditoria Superior de La Federación, 2009). It turned out that due to an 'imprecision of language', planting a seed could be counted as planting a tree. 11 This was ontological indeterminacy about what counted as a tree, rather than simple calculable uncertainty about tree survival. Indeterminacy was more radical still: it was impossible to calculate the proportion of trees that survived because one would have had to find presence where there was now absence, places where trees had once been but where they were no longer. Dead seedlings were not a small deal; for Cibrian's opponents, this area of nonknowledge was more powerful still if the trees could not be found at all because they could call into question how much money had been spent per tree planted, and whether the right budget categories had been used for the right purposes. In their haste to plant as many trees as possible, distant forestry technicians in the state of Chiapas, where the audit focused, had not kept accurate accounts. Critics argued that some people who had asked for trees had not received them. At this moment of institutional weakness, notations on distant pieces of paper, such as receipts for tree seedlings delivered to landowners in Chiapas, made it impossible for Cibrian and his auditors to produce a single number representing the cost per tree planted. This simple number, located on a single piece of paper, could perhaps have demonstrated financial responsibility and stabilized CONAFOR. Because they lacked this information, CONAFOR as an institution and Cibrian personally were under great pressure from critics who demanded transparency and accountability. Powerful public framings of the state, of expertise, and of the proper way of producing public knowledge had dictated that Cibrian draw authority from scientists or auditors who could be represented as being independent of him personally and of the state more broadly. His effort to produce an independent audit had been unmade by the parliamentary counter-audit, which called into question tree survival, what could be considered a tree, and whether trees had been planted at all. For the parliamentary opposition, nonknowledge had been fruitfully translated into a radical indeterminacy that destabilized calculations about tree survival and unmade Cibrian's claim that reforestation was successful. Popular understandings of what counted as a tree were critical in undermining the efficacy of performances of successful reforestation, so that when pictures of dying trees or cactuses surfaced in the media, uncertainty about tree survival became indeterminacy about trees and CONAFOR. This indeterminacy could, in turn, be linked to questionable audits, failed knowledge performances, and the legitimacy of the entire CONAFOR reforestation program.
Cibrian resigned 4 days after the parliamentary audit was published, on 17 March 2009. For 6 months, CONAFOR had no director; potential candidates jockeyed for the job, other people wondered whether CONAFOR would disappear entirely. It was at this moment of possibility and uncertainty that Guadalupe and I arrived in Juan Vazquez's office. Possibly, Vazquez was competing to be the new director of CONAFOR; if so, he had to read the political currents carefully and figure out how dangerous we might be. Perhaps, we were journalists who could be helpful, perhaps something else entirely? Like Cibrian, Vazquez had to judge his moment.
For Cibrian's knowledgeable audience, as for the people who followed the national reforestation campaign, the drama and interest of these events came in part from a sense that public performances are risky. Publics might be dangerous and must be handled skillfully. Far from being authoritative and stable, forestry institutions in Mexico might disintegrate if their knowledge performances did not work, if trees could be brought on stage dead and dying, or if notations on receipts for tree seedlings from Chiapas could be linked to domains of nonknowledge in the right way. This instability is not a sign of failure or of a weak Mexican state but of the way that systems of accounting fail to fully encompass and control lively material objects such as living trees or pieces of paper. All efforts to make public facts, whether by officials or by scientists, are produced through a weaving together of small things. Such small things can become big things at moments of scandal if lively publics come to understand a particular decision as standing for a general fact about such things as the state, expertise, or official corruption.
Global carbon accounting, markets for environmental services, and Mexican forests
Let us now turn to the PSA program that was run by the rather more cheerful Eduardo Espinoza. How could the PSA program, which disbursed large amounts of money to rural people, be judged to be so credible and stable, at more or less the same time that a mass reforestation program that spent large amounts of money on handing out trees to rural people had so spectacularly exploded? The answer, I suggest, is partially due to the charisma and glamor of the then-yet-to-exist REDD program and the possibility that REDD funds might be channeled through the PSA program. However, the credibility of PSA was also partially due to the skilled juggling of knowledge and nonknowledge carried out by government officials such as Espinoza, who were able to produce a collective fact of successful and credible forest protection, manage an unruly audience of 'arm's length allies' of interested experts and NGO representatives, and draw upon the credibility of satellite images and maps, allowing environmental markets to remain at a remove from the troubles of dying trees. Most obviously and crucially, the PSA and REDD projects did not count the kinds of things (i.e. seedlings and trees) that popular audiences could easily imagine touching and measuring. Both PSA and REDD projects measured a much more slippery kind of thing -the area of averted deforestation -an entity that hinged upon the construction of elaborate scenarios about uncertain social and environmental futures. Certainly, this made a critical counter-audit difficult, but this alone would probably have been insufficient without the skill of officials who ran the PSA program. Espinoza, unlike Cibrian, had skillfully managed forms of expert consultation, enlisting opponents and critics into consultative committees that sustained the public fact of successfully protected forest and of honestly distributed payments, even as these provisional supporters privately told alternative stories about lack of knowledge.
The non-market and the market as desired future
The Mexican PSA program was less market-like and more interesting than we might imagine (McAfee and Shapiro, 2010), as its inventors and leaders were the first to admit (Muñoz Piña et al., 2008) . Although it was formally a market mechanism that paid landowners for the hydrological services produced by forests, 12 the PSA was, in fact, a subsidy program that paid them a set price per hectare to leave their forest alone. As a practical matter, there is scientific uncertainty over just how much water, biodiversity, or carbon a given piece of forest provides, making it difficult or impossible to link a biophysical quantity to a cost, but popular understandings of solid connections between forests and water supplies helped stabilize the program. The program designers were well aware of the limited technical basis for this understanding and voiced these criticisms themselves, even as they tried to move toward a more perfect market future. Rather than paying people to protect forest at a high risk of being cut down (which would have been economically efficient), the lion's share of the funds went to relatively remote areas, owned by indigenous people, who probably had no intention of clearing land in the first place. How did this come to be? On this subject, they were less explicit.
Sitting in his office in Guadalajara, Espinoza highlighted the oversight committees where NGO representatives and academics monitored policies, pressed for changes, and hammered out the details of program design and implementation.
That's one of the advantages of the participative committees … they don't let you do what you want to do, as a government … furthermore, they are 'thinking eyes'. (Interview transcript, 22 July 2009) What Espinoza did not say was that forest communities and their allies had affected the design of the payment program through forestry councils, protests, and a peaceful occupation of CONAFOR offices in January 2008 recounted to me by an NGO leader (Interview transcript, 5 August 2009). According to NGO leaders, it was only under such pressure that CONAFOR had renegotiated the detailed rules of operation. This popular pressure ensured that forest owners were being paid to preserve forests that were not threatened in the first place, something that some government officials found profoundly troubling (Colegio de Posgraduados, 2008b). As a long-term interlocutor of these groups, Espinoza was able to accommodate their interests and had enough personal credibility to retain the support of organizations that are often quite critical of the state. In addition to acceding to the concerns of NGO's and the mobilizations that they might mount, Espinoza relied upon NGO leaders as interlocutors who were at a clear distance from the state but who were nevertheless willing to attend committee meetings and assent to official statistics. A skillful management of arm's length allies was therefore critical to Espinoza's relative success in stabilizing the PSA program.
NGO and community leaders also had pressured the state into accepting a shared, common sense understanding of visibly forested landscapes as the source of water and the location of biodiversity. This shared understanding sustained the credibility of the PSA program, even as it violated the intentions of its designers, who believed that protecting degraded or at-risk forests would produce the greatest environmental services. Furthermore, the NGOs had rejected the idea of an auction that would determine the appropriate opportunity cost of compensating a landowner for not clearing an area of forest because such an auction would have too closely resembled a sale of land, something that rural people would not have accepted. Officials had accepted a redefinition of what counted as forest for purposes of payments, and they had accepted that the program had to be presented to rural people as a subsidy, rather than as a payment in a 'market' for environmental services.
A broad array of critical academics and representatives of environmental organizations were willing to attend PSA committee meetings both at national and state levels, collaborating in the production of the public facts of equitable and efficient distribution of funds and of forests effectively protected. As in the case of reforestation, a public of potentially unruly critics was summoned into being by officials, but Espinoza was more skillful and lucky than Cibrian had been. Participating in meetings did not mean that environmental NGO leaders were fully confident about how payments were distributed or that forests were actually being protected. One former committee member told me that there was no way of knowing how effective the program had been in preventing deforestation. 'I don't think even CONAFOR has any information about that', he told me (interview transcript, 6 August 2009). Nevertheless, these potential critics (some of whom had participated in the fateful meetings where Cibrian had failed to secure their support) were willing to assent to the official success figures in return for a system of payments that rewarded their allies. Espinoza and his colleagues had been able to perform credible technical knowledge of forests successfully measured and protected, skillfully managing the potentially unruly publics who had been so difficult for Cibrian. This was a performance of official knowledge of the equitable distribution of funds for forest protection in the face of nonknowledge about actual forest protection, which relied upon political skill, biographies of key officials, and the willingness of officials to accede to popular demands according to standard choreographies of Mexican politics.
A further reason for the lack of scandal in the environmental services program, compared with the reforestation project, had to do with what was accounted and with the power of possible future carbon markets to cast a kind of unsettled promissory glamor upon the present. Landscapes or areas of forest are more indeterminate things than are tree seedlings; for now, this makes the PSA program less vulnerable to counter-audits and scandals than the reforestation program. In addition, the possibility that the PSA program might one day become part of a full-fledged carbon market to mitigate global climate change (REDD) made the PSA still more glamorous and silenced possible opponents. Both PSA and REDD programs drew upon visual rhetorics produced through satellite images and models of plausible futures; such images were a rhetoric of vision and knowledge that so far has been relatively impervious to the kinds of audits that unmade the reforestation program. Officials running the PSA program explicitly compared the quality of their audit with the fate of the reforestation program and explained that they had superior, visually appealing ways of proving that their program was working properly. One official told me that the reforestation scandal certainly affects other programs, I think that we are [in a process] of recovering our credibility. I feel that at least our program is based upon solid information, and furthermore, it is geographic information. We have 4000 polygons (map areas), where you can see the location and what is happening to payments to 4000 communities. Any external auditor can randomly pick any one of these polygons and verify. (Interview transcript, 22 August 2009) The promise of cartographic verification, of a map that showed where forest had been protected and who had been paid to protect it, was a critical means of making the whole environmental services program credible. There was, however (as critics had earlier remarked), no easy way of telling whether an area of forest was actually being protected, and no easily available geographic information system where auditors could verify such a fact. Forest area was both visually enticing and hard to delimit; it both supported the PSA program and evaded hostile audits. In fact, far from verifying that forest area was protected, regional-level forestry officials told me that they were concerned with verifying payments to landowners and with ensuring that forest communities had completed the activities that they had agreed to do (interview transcript, 1 August 2009). Furthermore, they told me that rather than taking official notice of forest clearance, they preferred to ask forest communities to substitute alternative areas of untouched forest.
Contrary to the effortless geographic transparency suggested by Espinoza, assessing land-cover change at the level of individual landholdings is laborious, costly, and ambiguous even when satellite imagery or aerial photographs are used. As a result, the audit of the PSA program concentrated almost entirely upon customer satisfaction and ease of payment (Colegio de Posgraduados, 2008a) and assessed success in forest protection not by measuring forest area but by comparing the area of forest with a scenario that projected past deforestation trends into a plausible future. 13 No parliamentary audit commission, nor any visitors from hostile environmental organizations, would have found a smoking gun in the skilled judgments by which past landscapes and socioeconomic models were linked with scenarios of plausible futures. The idea of mapping and the rhetoric of cartographic transparency promised to make audits possible, even as the use of scenarios rather than literal accounts of forest areas allowed the environmental services program to hover above the landscape, and be held accountable to very different measures of environment protection. Crucially, uncertain futures and areas of forest that could not be counted could be used to stabilize the environmental services program in the present. Here, as in the case of mass reforestation, technical knowledge about whether forests were being protected was necessarily performed against nonknowledge about where forests were and whether deforestation had been averted. For the environmental services program, this nonknowledge could be linked to authoritative performances of technical expertise, to visually enticing maps, and to the assent of willing groups of experts. Nonknowledge about the future was particularly helpful because it could be understood as promise and possibility, possibly as financially valuable risk, but not as destabilizing indeterminacy about what institutions and landscapes were.
Carbon worlds, REDD, and scenario planning
In the cases I have given so far, we have seen how the Mexican state moves from producing statistical authority of its own in the case of mass reforestation to a new technology of verification for the PSA program, which depends not only upon mundane audits of pieces of paper, which acknowledge the receipt of payments by landowners, but upon the charisma and glamor of satellite images, models of averted deforestation, and the relationships between independent land-cover change scientists and their international colleagues. The actually existing PSA program was bolstered by the cartographic authority of the yet-to-be-built REDD one, with which it shared a commitment to producing a market in environmental services. The REDD program, it was hoped, would pay forest landowners for the carbon stored in their forests, halting deforestation and slowing down climate change. The possibility that large amounts of money would be brought to Mexican forests through a REDD program was one factor in the decision by possible opponents and critics to refrain from criticizing the PSA program. Although REDD proponents explain that it is conceptually a very simple policy (Angelsen, 2008: 1) , it is in fact an extraordinarily complex technology, requiring the coordination of techniques of measurement and verification with state support for stable property rights and financial markets. Such projects might seem speculative and risky in the extreme, given the failures of mass reforestation, but they are anchored in a different economy of knowledge and nonknowledge. Crucially, REDD works not through counting the kinds of mundane objects understood by ordinary people (tree seedlings, receipts for tree seedlings, or areas of forest) but through visually appealing map-like images of present and future forest landscapes, which are anchored on much more nebulous categories such as 'area of averted deforestation' and 'forest at risk'.
A broad array of Mexican scientists and technicians with strong connections to international science provides the credibility and independence to certify these alternative projects of vision and knowing (Brown et al., 2007; De Jong et al., 2005 Tschakert et al., 2008) . REDD policies begin with an initial measurement of the amount of carbon stored across a landscape. A reference scenario, also known as the business as usual scenario, is then constructed. This is an account of what would have happened had the world continued as it was going to do prior to the introduction of the REDD program. The reference scenario is then compared with the measured amount of carbon stored in forests and soils after the REDD program has intervened and a period of time has elapsed. If more carbon is present than would have been stored under the reference scenario, additional carbon dioxide is considered to have been removed from the atmosphere. This additional carbon can then, it is hoped, be sold on international carbon markets, should treaty agreements provide the financial and political support to make this possible. For REDD projects, the risky fate of future forests is something which can, it is hoped, be sold.
In this carbon world, real-time monitoring of forests produces scientific knowledge that is credible to international buyers. Remote sensing of forests is attractive to policymakers because it is relatively cheap and has the quality of instant direct perception and inspection that escapes the kind of visual attack deployed in campaigns showing the failed attempts at reforestation by, for example, Greenpeace. It does not matter whether trees here or there have died; it is at the scale of the landscape that knowledge is made, and few critics can produce expensive satellite imagery with its associated cartographic and spatial authority. Figure 6 , for example, looks, at first, like a satellite image, but it is, in fact, a statistical estimate of the probability of each pixel being deforested in a given period of time. Past land-cover change is correlated with the factors such as distance from roads, rural employment, marginality, and the proportion of the population who are officially known to be indigenous, in order to produce a model of plausible future deforestation (e.g. Castillo-Santiago et al., 2007) . This, then, is a map of plausible future deforestation risk, presented in the visual conventions of cartographic knowledge. 14 The map makers estimate what combination of social and economic factors will affect forests over the next few years as they construct the crucial business as usual scenario, their story about how the world was going to go. Crucially, scenarios are not forecasts of calculable probable futures; rather, they express a judgment about credible and plausible future states of the world that are intrinsically impossible to calculate as probabilities (Cooper, 2010) . For example, scenarios of deforestation over the next 10 years are affected by scenario builders' assessments of the likelihood of a spike in oil prices, of an expansion in cattle ranching, or of a decline in rural-urban migration. Any of these processes could be triggered by international political or financial events whose likelihood is inherently incalculable. This incalculable future is a domain of nonknowledge tamed through the business as usual scenario, the images and technical writings of land-cover change scientists, and the possibility that these might enable the flow of money to support REDD policies.
Similar to the audit of the environmental services program, REDD models rely upon scenarios about the future. Similar to the environmental services program, which it does so much to support, REDD models portray a kind of cartographic vision that exists alongside uncertain and unknowable futures. For our present purpose, what is of interest is that as in the cases of mass reforestation and the environmental services program, knowledge making for REDD modelers sits against domains of nonknowledge, not as a sign of failure but as a sign of possibility, value, and energy. Here, nonknowledge is tamed through scenarios of forest landscapes at risk, producing promise of an uncertain future that is calculated but never fully tamed. This uncertainty may become a source of value, political authority, or career advancement. Perhaps forestry officials could hire many more assistants or create new institutions if REDD is implemented (some CONAFOR officials were rumored to be hoping for this). Certainly the uncertain but promising future of REDD programs supported the PSA program. Perhaps most importantly, nonknowledge about future forest landscapes could be transformed into calculable risk through practices of scenario making and land-cover change modeling. This risk could perhaps be given a market value that would attract large amounts of money into Mexican forests. It was an open secret that the possibility of carbon finance was one reason for the assent to the PSA program by some NGO representatives.
Conclusion
In this article, I have briefly described two existing projects that link Mexican forests to mitigating climate change, and I have outlined how the yet-to-exist REDD project helps stabilize the actually existing environmental services (PSA) project. I have described the strategies through which expertise, political skill, and technical knowledge are performed against domains of nonknowledge, and I have suggested that classic STS concerns with knowledge production, and stabilization can be enriched by asking how performances, rhetorics, and material objects are linked to domains of nonknowledge. I have shown how different strategies of knowledge performance by officials have encountered different popular understandings of forests, entrenched understandings of proper forms of expertise, and different forms of political organization, resulting in a scandal (for the mass reforestation campaign) and the public fact of efficacy for the environmental services program.
Performances of official knowledge before lively and possibly unruly publics are tricky and sometimes fail: publics are domains of nonknowledge, which can produce assent, generate protests, or sustain public facts. The possibility of failure defines a domain of nonknowledge and makes officials' knowledge performances interesting and potentially charismatic. The liveliness of Mexican trees (which might live or die), documents (which might be properly filled in or otherwise), and landscapes (which might be measured) produced domains of nonknowledge that had to be linked to credible technical knowledge, skillful political performances, and possibly restive publics. Liveliness of people and the material resistance of the natural world were not defects in knowledge performances: these resistances were precisely what made these performances interesting and gave them purchase on their audiences' imaginations. In each case, practices of calculation and prediction were made plausible by enduring popular understandings about what the state is and does. In each case, mundane practices had the potential to become scandals when public understandings about the proper way of performing technical knowledge and political authority failed to be met. At such moments, the pragmatics of expert decisions about trees or documents came to be understood not as small-scale local decisions, but as standing for mass reforestation, official corruption, or the efficacy of the state.
The sweet gum tree planted by President Calderon in the gardens of Coyoacán was linked to an inadequate effort to produce the public fact of successful reforestation. Performances of reforestation appealed both to a new politics of corporate-sponsored civic environmentalism and to the traditional knowledge politics of the corporatist Mexican state. The more old-fashioned, corporatist knowledge politics were the public events where reason and power were performed by the President and his representatives, where national deforestation statistics represented the state as knower and doer, and where children and young people were encouraged to love and plant trees. Corporatesponsored reforestation, sponsored by the Bimbo group, was linked to cheerful young people and volunteers and less directly linked to the state or the president. However, the sweet gum tree in the park in Mexico City was also linked to popular understandings of the Mexican state as dangerous and of public knowledge as an illusion that concealed something darker and more dangerous. Representations of happy families planting trees were vulnerable to alternative images of dead and dying trees and to stories of corrupt, failed reforestation projects. Knowledge performances by bureaucrats failed to persuade skeptical audiences, and ultimately, details about living and dying trees surfaced on the political stage and threatened institutions and careers. In point of fact, the reforestation campaign was not necessarily a failure in terms of actual tree survival, but rather, it failed because the uncertainty of tree survival could be turned into a story about official corruption and incompetence.
The related form of nature in the making was the PSA program, which was stabilized by epistemic alliances between forestry officials and publics of academics and NGO leaders who were willing to participate in technical working groups and advisory committees. Participation in committees demonstrated collective assent to the public facts of subsidy payments being well spent, according to legitimate and credible technical criteria. The PSA program was linked to understandings of the state as a convener of civil society actors who were at a credible distance from officials. Crucially, the state alone could not produce credible statistics about efficacy or success (as Cibrian's experience demonstrated). The success of the PSA program existed alongside public secrets about the political pressures that modified the program and about its actual efficacy. The PSA program was also supported by an area of promising uncertainty, the promissory possibility that REDD projects could bring millions of dollars to Mexican forests and fund dramatic changes in conservation policy. As REDD has given way to REDD+, the PSA program continues to be the primary means by which REDD-related payments are disbursed, and given CONAFOR's history of acceding to the demands of indigenous communities and their allies, it may continue to be broadly legitimate.
The REDD project was incipient when the fieldwork for this article was carried out: a group of policymakers, land-cover change scientists, and civil society representatives were discussing the likely form of such a project, should it ever come into being. REDD policies were linked to the possibility of building a speculative carbon world that would link new forms of remote sensing and carbon inventories, with state institutions, financial regulations, nonstate academic actors, and rural people who could protect trees, all with the aim of producing a credible representation of Mexican forests as places of carbon storage. Here, forests were linked to very different economies of knowledge: it was explicitly nonstate actors such as scientists and NGOs with international financial backing who could make carbon forestry credible. Here, too, knowledge was framed against nonknowledge about future social and economic events and about the risk of deforestation, but this nonknowledge was tamed as calculable risk and became lively and possibly valuable. Scenarios about the future were politically consequential stories that could stabilize institutions and might produce flows of money. Although there have been significant policy changes since 2010, when REDD+ became the official policy of the Mexican state, funds have continued to be disbursed through the PSA program and other established mechanisms, and there has been relatively little organized indigenous opposition to REDD+ in Mexico to date.
As the state moves from certifying the survival of individual trees to the presence of forest across the landscape to areas of averted deforestation, new forms of public assent, witnessing, and imagining are called upon. These official forms of knowledge are linked to different ontologies of forests. People in Mexico were sure that they knew what a tree was, and it was this common sense understanding of trees that helped mass reforestation come to be seen as a failure. The PSA program was stabilized by common sense understandings of areas of forest as sources of water: the greater the forest, the more water. The case of REDD is different: it calls upon the glamor of remote sensing and satellite images, but in addition, it calls upon the use of imagined plausible futures to stabilize a nebulous object, an area of averted deforestation. The importance of plausible futures is not confined to the case of REDD, nor to Mexico. In the face of technological, political, and environmental uncertainty and multiple forms of indeterminacy, states may increasingly no longer be assessed upon their calculation of probable futures, as in the Mexican state's traditional performances of mass reforestation, or its public demonstrations of statistical success (Mathews, 2008) . Perhaps, the state will begin to be judged by the plausibility of the scenarios that it has used to plan for inherently uncertain and uncalculable futures, as in the war-gaming exercises described by Joseph Masco (2013) and Melinda Cooper (2010) or in the technical working groups that seek to imagine future forests in Mexico.
To date, models of carbon futures and scenarios of socioenvironmental change have succeeded in obtaining the assent of experts, bureaucrats, and some international policymakers. However, it is much less clear whether such scenarios will appeal to the imaginations of publics, whether in Mexico or elsewhere, that think about unstable states and uncertain or indeterminate climate futures.
The kinds of ethnographic details that I have described here matter not just because as scholars of science and politics we love thick descriptions of social life, but because at some moments, these kinds of small details can become a big deal, as when minor events become scandals of knowledge that rock ministries. STS and anthropological studies of laboratory life, and of science in practice, like ethnographies of bureaucratic practice, agree that mundane practices of knowledge making are bounded by the limits of pragmatic knowledge. At some moments, particular pragmatic decisions are judged by witnessing publics to be failures, whether of technical skill, bureaucratic honesty, or an official knowledge performance. Following Jasanoff (2005), I have described how in Mexico witnessing publics evaluate knowledge performances according to wellentrenched framings of the state, expertise, and how officials and experts ought to behave. Popular ontologies about forests can be similarly important. When public understandings of expertise, forests, or states are not met, a small detail can come to stand for something of large-scale import such as the stability of a forestry institution or the efficacy of a reforestation program. It is through enduring framings of expertise, popular ontologies about what forests are, and enduring narratives about the state that small things can become big things, redefining what is important and what is insignificant. Recent accounting scandals only confirm the message that we do not know beforehand what is small and what is large, that this is always only provisionally settled. Thinking about knowledge performances and the limits of accounting focuses our attention upon how apparently local events are connected to larger institutions and upon how the fates of trees may affect the fates of ministries. The suspense for the witnesses of official performances of expertise and authority is not only about whether what the President is saying is correct but about the more interesting question of whether his performance of state, nature, climate, and future forests can stick.
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Notes
REDD+ and AFOLU (Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use) describe alternative policies that seek to take advantage of the ability of forests and agricultural land to absorb atmospheric carbon dioxide (Angelsen, 2008) . For the purposes of this article, I will call all of these policies REDD, although from the UNFCCC meetings in Cancun 2010 onward, REDD+ has become the dominant policy form. 4. As REDD has been displaced by REDD+ after the UNFCCC meetings in Cancun in 2010, 'pure' market approaches, which envisaged monitoring and paying for carbon stored at the level of individual forest properties, have been displaced by REDD+ strategies in which agricultural and forest management practices are taken into account and carbon storage is monitored and verified at larger scales. Mexico's National REDD+ strategy contemplates setting up pilot projects that will ultimately be replaced by a full-scale national monitoring and verification system that can demonstrate carbon storage at the national level (CONAFOR et al., 2010) . At the time of the writing of this article, no developing country has a functioning 'Monitor Report and Verify' system, and none has reported 'national baseline' figures that would be required to fully implement REDD+. The most recent World Bank forest/climate project for Mexico focuses the vast majority of its US$725m project funds upon support for forest management and the PSA program, with much smaller amounts on monitoring and verification technologies and on developing three pilot state-level REDD+ projects (World Bank, 2012). 5. Since this time, an increasing number of indigenous groups and other concerned actors around the world have begun to oppose REDD+ projects, raising concerns about 'land-grabs', and prior informed consent, although to date, this has been less of a concern in Mexico. For a nuanced discussion of the issues of justice raised by REDD+ policies, see Forsyth and Sikor (2013) . 6. I owe my introduction to the term 'nonknowledge' to Julie Chu (2010) , who explores related topics in her book Cosmologies of Credit. 7. Tim Ingold (2012) observes, 'To describe any material is to pose a riddle, whose answer can be discovered only through observation and engagement with what is there'. I suggest that this riddling quality is a sign of nonknowledge that is partially tamed through observation and engagement. 8. There is a large literature on accounting, but for present purposes, I highlight the inherent incompleteness of systems of accounting and their ability to link people and things in unpredictable ways (see MacKenzie, 2008; Maurer, 2003; Quattrone, 2004) . 9. I have used Cibrian's real name rather than a pseudonym. 10. The official transcript is more ambiguous (Gaceta Parlamentaria, 2008) but contains criticism of accounting and concern about the success of tree plantings. 11. Of 350,000,000 trees planted in 2007, 100,000,000 turned out to have been seeds rather than seedlings (Auditoria Superior de La Federación, 2009: 416) . 12. Conceptual and empirical connections between forests and water supplies have a long history and have been influential in many places, including Mexico (Mathews, 2009) and Thailand (Forsyth and Walker, 2008) . 13. Studies that compare the projected forest cover against likely future deforestation suggest that forest protected by the PSA program does, in fact, have a modest effect in terms of averted deforestation (see Alix-Garcia et al., 2010) . 14. In the logic of REDD, the most valuable part of the landscape is that which is most threatened in the business as usual (or baseline) scenario because preventing degradation there will make the most difference in terms of averted carbon emissions. This means that scenarios about the environmentally degrading activities by poor or indigenous people are necessary if REDD policies are to allow officials to help poor people financially. The more negative the scenario, the more potentially valuable it becomes for purposes of REDD payments.
